Red Star Macalline (1528.HK) – Share buyback

In April 2018, Red Star Macalline (RSM)(1528.HK) announced a share buyback of 388m H-shares (around 36% of total H-shares and 10% of total issued shares) at a price of HKD 11.78. RSM is conservatively financed with RMB 10.6b in cash vs RMB 16.4b in debt and RMB 43.9b in equity (as of 31 Dec 2017). As the offer is projected to utilise a significant amount of cash of around RMB 3.8b, it is subject to approval of bondholders as well as A and H shares shareholders.

I personally think that the reason for this significant share buyback is twofold. Firstly, the current price is cheap in my opinion, and the buyback benefits continuing shareholders. More importantly, I surmise that it gives substantial shareholder of 39% of the H shares, Warburg Pincus, a chance for a timely and substantial exit. Warburg Pincus is a private equity firm which invested in RSM in a few placements over time since 2008. The mandate for the lifetime of a private equity fund is up to around 10 years. Hence, this opportunity is probably set up for Warburg Pincus to do at least a partial exit of their investment since they opted not to do so when RSM was listed in 2015.

On 31 May 2018, RSM announced that it has obtained the approval of bondholders in a meeting. The bondholders were given an incentive of additional interest on their bonds till maturity to vote for the proposal. The shareholder’s meeting is on 8 June 2018, but it is almost a certainty that it will be passed since we have the blessing of the founder, who controls around 86% of the A-shares and Warburg Pincus, who controls 39% of the H-shares.

The way the buyback works is that shareholders may tender any amount of their share. They will be guaranteed that all the shares tendered in this manner will be repurchased at HKD 11.78 if they tender an amount which is equal to or less than 36.59% of their current holdings. If they tender an amount over 36.59% of their holdings, then 36.59% of the tendered shares will be repurchased and any amount tendered in excess of 36.59% will be subject to proportionate pro ration, depending on how many shares are tendered by the other shareholders.

The price of RSM is HKD 10.66 as of 4 June 2018. Since there is no guarantee that any shares in excess of 36.59% tendered will be accepted, there is no arbitrage possibility in this scenario.

However, for current shareholders of the RSM who wish to continue holding shares after this exercise such as myself, there are two options. I can increase by current holdings by an amount which allows me to maintain the same amount of shares after validly tendering at least 36.59% of my shares. For example if I have 10 shares, I will buy an additional 5.7 shares. After I tender 5.7 shares, I will end up owning 10 shares like before, and earn a profit of HKD 11.78-10.6 = HKD 1.18 per share tendered, plus a dividend of RMB 0.32 which goes ex on 14 June 2018. This dividend will be subject to a 10% tax and the net proceeds will be around HKD 0.35.

Of course, the price is almost certain to fall after the share buyback. Otherwise it is possible to arbitrage by buying any amount now, tendering, and selling the remaining shares that were not tendered successfully at equal or higher than the current price. If the price falls significantly, it may be better to sell at the current price, in expectation of buying them back at a lower price in the future. The total profits earned from the 5.7 shares in the earlier example equals to 5.7 shares * (dividend HKD 0.35 + buyback profits HKD 1.18) = HKD 8.72. If you average this over your original 10 share holdings, it amounts to around HKD 0.87 per share.

This implies that it makes sense to buy 57% more shares at the current price of HKD 10.60 if I think that the price will fall by less than HKD 0.87 after the exercise. Otherwise, it is better for me to sell my entire holdings now to buy back later everything later.

Hence, the question is how much will the share price fall after the exercise? Unfortunately, I have no divination of the future price. However, I am more inclined to the first option because there are a few reasons why I think it is likely to be better than the second option.

Firstly, I think that it is likely that the company will be valued more highly than before the buyback was announced (HKD 10.02, 3 Apr 2018) because this exercise is beneficial to the company. It shows management’s willingness to unlock value in a significant way when they think that the share price is low. This is not very common among Hong Kong listed companies. It also increases the gearing level of the company which, paradoxically, I think is a positive for the company. The market typically assigns a lower valuation to property companies with more conservative gearing levels. This makes sense because investing in property on an unlevered basis typically does not give a return on invested capital as high as one can get by owning a variety of other listed businesses. Having a good but not excessive amount of leverage can enhance the return on capital of property companies without increasing the probability of bankruptcy to a significant level. At current gearing levels, I think RSM is very conservatively managed.

Secondly, I will tender 100% of my shares. There is a non-zero chance that more than 36.59% of my holdings get repurchased. This will increase my profits by more than HKD 0.87 per share, which makes it more likely that the first option is the better one.

Thirdly, this is a minor point but the first option costs far less to execute in terms of transaction costs than the second option.

I will increase my current holdings by 57% and tender 100% of my shares, although I don’t expect that a significant amount in excess of 36.59% will be repurchased.

Fu Shou Yuan (1448.HK) – “Property Developer” with 80% Gross Margins

Birth, marriage and death are considered very important events in Chinese culture. Birth and marriage are accompanied with happy celebrations, but death is something that is seen as inauspicious and a taboo subject.

Nevertheless, the concept of filial piety is strong in China and no expenses are spared in conducting a proper funeral and burial for the deceased. Incidentally, there is also a three day national holiday every year for Qingming festival, when people visit their ancestors’ graves to give offerings and pay their respects.

After a person’s death, a funeral is usually conducted in accordance to their beliefs, culture, religion and traditions. Subsequently, as mandated by law in most urban areas, the body is cremated. In rural areas, burials of non-cremated bodies are mostly allowed.

Cremation is encouraged by the government because of the sheer size of the population. Cremation is performed only by government entities with strict control on pricing. After cremation, the cremains are buried in a burial plot in a cemetery or stored in a columbarium.

Business

Fu Shou Yuan (1448.HK) is a provider of burial and funeral services in China, with operations in more than 10 cities. It reported profits of RMB 550m on revenues of RMB 1.47b in 2017. 88.0% of total revenues came from burial services and 10.7% came from funeral services, with the rest coming from auxillary services.

Since burial services comprise the overwhelming majority of revenue, I will only focus on analysis of burial services. It comprises of revenue generated from selling burial plots in cemeteries operated by FSY. Selling burial plots is a localized business as people typically do not go to cemeteries in other towns or cities to bury their loved ones. According to Fu Shou Yuan (FSY), their cemeteries and funeral facilities generally serve customers who live within a 1 to 1.5hr radius.

The number of customers that death care services providers are able to attract is largely a function of reputation, quality of service and well-maintained and conveniently located facilities, although other factors such as competitive pricing are also important factors.

Due to the importance of reputation, quality of service and well-maintained and conveniently located facilities, new or smaller less well-known death care services providers will generally take a long period of time to increase their customer base.

Families tend to return to the same cemetery for multiple generations due to family ties and convenience of future visits. As the largest death care service provider in Shanghai, where FSY derives more than 50% of their total revenues from, this is a big competitive advantage.

However, I believe that the reputation advantage does not extend geographically because of the localized nature of the business and low frequency of purchase in a customer’s lifetime. In other words, if FSY operates a new cemetery in a new city, it may also be difficult to attract new customers due to entrenched competitors with better local reputation. Furthermore, of the 14 cemeteries operated by FSY, only 5 is operated under the FSY brand.

FSY “owns” plots of land, usually of around 100,000 sqm or more. Such land requires government land zoning approval to be used as a cemetery. The land is then gradually developed over time, designed by landscape architects into aesthetically pleasing cemeteries to house burial plots.

In China, all land are owned by the state or the local government. Hence, when anyone buys land, they are actually buying the “land use right” for a fixed number of years, after which the rights have to be renewed for a fee, or the land has to be returned.

There is, however, an exception. Some land, such as portions of FSY’s Shanghai’s land parcels, are considered “allocated land”. Such land do not have a definitive term or payment of land premium. This is highly valuable, especially in Shanghai where burial service prices are high as FSY enjoys the increase in land prices over time without having to fork out any additional land premium. But, if there are changes in the laws governing allocated land, FSY may be forced to return the land or fork out a land premium at the prevailing market rate.

The service provided by FSY in signing a contract with a customer is the safekeeping of the cremains for a specified amount of time (ranging from 20-70 years) , and does not involve a transfer of the land use rights to the customer. The contract price also includes a portion for cemetery maintenance fees. The time specified in the contract may sometimes be longer than the land use right of the land. Though it is unlikely, in future cases where FSY is unable to extend the land use right, they may be legally required to compensate customers for not being able to use the burial plot for the remaining term in the contract. At the end of the contract, the customer may renew it at the prevailing market rate or retrieve the cremains, otherwise FSY may handle the cremains at its own discretion.

The table below shows the number of burial plots sold, land expended, and land bank held by FSY. Here, like land expended, land bank is defined as the total estimated saleable area designated to burial plots only, and does not include common areas like walkways and landscaping.

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
No of units sold 7,667 10,093 17,322 13,142 22,663
Land expended (sqm) 17,848 20,690 40,998 35,644 33,546
Land bank (sqm) 972,664 1,387,724 1,610,000 1,810,000 1,960,000

The number of burial plots sold increased over time, with the exception of 2015-2016. The reason for the drop is because in 2015 there was a one time relocation of tombs paid for by the local government in Henan of about 3,500 burial plots, and 2,400 sold at very low prices for social welfare purpose. If we only count the normally priced burial plots, there was an increase of more than 10% sold in 2016. 2017’s units sold came in flat year on year, after excluding the 656 units in 2016 and 10,291 units in 2017 sold at very low prices.

Based on 2017 sales, the current land bank is enough to last for a few decades. The reason for holding so much land bank is that land zoned for cemetery use is scarce due to difficulty in getting zoning approvals. Holding land now to develop in the future benefits from increasing land prices due to limited supply against increasing demand.

The table below shows the average selling price (ASP) and quantity of 3 types of burial services sold by FSY in the respective years. These 3 types of burials make up 80-85% of total burial service revenue.Untitled

The prices of each type of burial service differ from city to city, and price changes over the years may be due to difference in sales mix. But, one clear price trend is the increase in customized burial plot prices. Customized burial services allow for customers to fully customize their burial plots, allowing them to decide on the location, size, and design and layout of the burial plot, and the types and styles of memorials and decorative items to be used.

In my opinion, people in China generally do not shop around and haggle when it comes to the funeral and burial of their loved ones. Having a funeral and burial befitting of the social status of the deceased, and compatible with their religion, culture, beliefs and tradition is of greater importance. Consumers, especially those who are more well to do, may be quite price insensitive for death care services.

The average absolute price point of customized burials is about 6 times China’s GDP per capita, implying that this kind of service is probably only bought by very well to do customers. I think the reason for FSY’s implied pricing power in this category is due to limited supply of cemeteries, target customer price insensitivity and opaqueness of pricing due to highly customized nature of the product.

I believe that the increase in price for customized burials should continue to be realized in the future, and this is significant for FSY as such services make up between 25-30% of total burial services revenue.

However, in a recession, my personal guess is that the standardized burial services will be able to maintain their demand and pricing, whereas prices for customized burials will be adjusted downwards.

Industry

The death care industry in China is highly fragmented and highly regulated. Even though FSY is the largest player, it only has a market share of about 1%. Most of the players are government owned. Government owned entities are typically run for social welfare purposes and may not be as efficient or well managed as their privately owned, for profit counterparts.

There are several barriers to entry to the industry, which favour the largest local incumbents.

Firstly, government approval is required to set up a funeral or burial service company. This is a difficult and lengthy process which may take up to a few years.

Secondly, land for building cemeteries need to have zoning approval. This can also take up to a few years and land zoned for such purposes is limited in quantity.

Thirdly, the industry lacks experienced professionals as it is not an industry which people are likely to join due to the social stigma associated. New employees are often relatives of those already in the industry.

Growth

In my opinion, FSY’s organic growth in the future will largely be from increase in prices and units sold. Prices for burial services sold is likely to increase due to reasons mentioned before. There are about 10m deaths in China every year, with this number expected to increase due to China’s ageing population. With the urbanisation rate set to increase as the country develops further, the demand for FSY’s services will increase as mandated by laws in cities for compulsory cremation.

Also, FSY started selling their self-developed eco-friendly cremation machines in 2017 and expects this to be a major contributor to revenues in the future. According to them, this is currently the only locally produced cremation machine that is able to meet the stricter emission standards that the government is rolling out over the years.

Another source of growth is through acquisitions. The market is highly fragmented and dominated with state players, with FSY being the largest player. Hence, it is unlikely that any single acquisition of a private operator will add significant value. However, the RMB 441m spent on acquisitions from 2013-2016 has been value accretive. This is because competitors were typically bought out at around 1.5x book whereas FSY enjoys a valuation of 3-4x book.

Lastly, while the brand equity of FSY as a national brand is not as strong to consumers unlike other consumer brands, its positive reputation among industry players is quite important. This is because the government is looking to deregulate the industry over time and may allow private operators to take up a greater share of the death care industry or form partnerships with them in carrying out services. FSY, which has one of the strongest reputation in the industry, is likely to be more favored by the government.

FSY has three ongoing partnerships with local governments, namely in Jiangsu Dafeng, Shandong Taian, and Chongqing Bishan. All partnerships are based on the build, operate, transfer model, whereby FSY is responsible for building and management of funeral parlours and cemeteries for 35-50 years. Profits accrue to FSY during this period and at the end of the term, the operations are transferred to the local government at no cost.

Capital Allocation

FSY spent a total of RMB 441m in acquisitions since 2013. The two most significant were a 70% interest in Guanglingshan Cultural Cemetery (GCC) for a consideration of RMB 279m and a 80% interest in Changzhou Qifengshan Cemetery (CQC) for a consideration of RMB 184m. GCC contributed RMB 141m and CQC contributed RMB 30m in revenues in 2016.

Around a third of earnings are paid as dividends. This is reasonable but FSY can afford to pay more. There is RMB 1.5b in cash and time deposits against RMB 100m in borrowings. Unless FSY spends a lot more on acquisitions, the free cash flow generated every year will build up the existing cash level quickly.

Valuation

In summary, I think FSY has a very strong competitive position with a long runway for growth from acquisitions and pricing power.

With RMB 417m in profits attributable to shareholders and share price of HKD 7.14, this represents a P/E ratio of around 31. In my opinion, the current price represents fair value at best compared to what other companies with similar competitive characteristics are selling for at the moment.

If FSY is able to continue its strong earnings growth in the future, you will still do well by entering at today’s levels. I prefer to be more conservative and wait for a better valuation, keeping in mind that the intrinsic value of the underlying business is quite likely to grow at a decent rate in the future.

There is also one caveat of taking FSY’s earnings at face value, which I will discuss below.

A typical property developer has “lumpy” earnings, because its earnings from the development of a project are “one-off” in nature. If it does not acquire more land for future development, it will not report any earnings. As such, valuing a property developer based on a multiple of earnings may not accurately reflect the value of the business.

FSY’s business is similar to a property developer in that it obtains land, develops and “sells” it to customers. But, the difference is that there is continuity in FSY’s earnings because it is able to earn revenues for the same plot of land indefinitely. Effectively, the customer signs a fixed term contract to “buy” some space on the land, and has to pay to renew at the end of the term. If they choose not to renew, FSY can reuse and “sell” the space to a new customer. Here, I am assuming that the land use right obtained by FSY is renewable indefinitely, albeit at a price.

Once a burial plot is constructed and delivered to a customer, the full amount is recorded as revenue. On the other hand, revenue from the provision of cemetery maintenance services, is deferred and amortized on a straight-line basis over the remaining service period. The full price paid for both services are received as cash on the sale of the burial plot.

Land and initial development costs are amortized until a particular area is designated for sale of burial plots. The land and initial development costs for that particular area are moved into inventory, and expensed when the burial plots are sold after further development costs.

In my opinion, the net profit figure is a reasonable representation of the economic benefit that flows to FSY. The cash flow figure is inflated because the full amount of cemetery maintenance is collected upfront and cash payment for “land use rights” were incurred fully at the time of purchase, which could have been many years ago.

Then, is FSY’s earnings in any given year a good representation of its long term earnings power? I think the answer is not so simple. It depends on the weighted average duration of the customers’ contracts as well as the percentage of saleable area sold in that year.

Let’s consider the simple case where FSY only has one plot of land, and the weighted average duration of a new customer contract is 50 years. If FSY sells 100% of the saleable area in the first year, it will record all of the profits and receive cash upfront from the sale of burial plots in that year. From the second year onwards, FSY will be unable to sell any more burial plots as there is no space available until the customer contract is due in 50 years. It will only record cemetery maintenance revenues for the next 49 years. Such revenues are a fraction of profits recorded in the first year.

Based on the example above, it is clear that if we were to value FSY based on a multiple of its first year’s earnings, we would be vastly overestimating its earnings power. It would only be an accurate representation if the weighted average duration of a new customer contract is 1 year.

By observation, if x years is the weighted average duration of a new customer contract, earnings in any single year is a roughly accurate representation of FSY’s long term earnings power only if they sell (100/x) percent or less of total saleable area on average in any given year.

If the average area sold in a year is more than (100/x) percent of total saleable area, FSY will run out of saleable land faster than it can charge customers again for the same plot of land. Earnings in any given year will be an overestimate of its actual earnings power.

If the average area sold in a year is less than (100/x) percent of total saleable area, all of the saleable land will not be fully used up at any given time, hence ensuring a recurring source of profits indefinitely. In this case, profits in any given year will be a reasonable representation of earnings power, but FSY is not maximizing the profit potential of its land.

If the average area sold in a year is equal to (100/x) percent of total saleable area, this is the rate of sales which naturally ensures that the maximum possible amount of land is available for sale each year given that profits in each year must be roughly the same. Hence, this is the ideal case where profits are being maximised and profits in any given year is a reasonable representation of earnings power.

In all the cases above, I am making the critical assumption that the prices of burial plots do not change over time and cemetery maintenance profits are insignificant relative to profits from sale of burial plots.

To accurately calculate FSY’s earnings power, we need the following data for each cemetery:

1. Weighted average duration of existing customer contracts and total saleable land sold in the past

2. Weighted average duration of new customer contracts and average saleable land sold in a year

Unfortunately, data needed to accurately evaluate the reasonableness of earnings may not be readily available.

In Shanghai (53.5% of revenues), we know that the business started in 1994 according to the IPO prospectus. Further, the average term of each customer contract is typically 70 years (p162, IPO prospectus). Therefore the optimal rate of sale of  land should be 100/70 = 1.4% annually.

On p2 of this research piece by Macquarie, saleable area in 2015 in Shanghai is 186,046 sqm out of a total area of 303,729 sqm. This implies that 117,683 sqm of area was sold from 1994-2015, at an average of 5,603 sqm per year. This is about 1.8% of the total area, which is higher than the optimal rate of sale of 1.4% annually. This may suggest that current earnings are inflated.

In conclusion, one should be mindful that any future increase in earnings due to an accelerated sale of land may not be sustainable because FSY is enjoying current earnings at the expense of future earnings. In such a case, it needs to continually depend on other sources such as acquisitions or a new product line in order to make up for the “loss” in future earnings as a result of selling land too quickly at the present.

 

2017 Performance Update

My portfolio gained 36.9% in 2017.

On an absolute basis, this is a good performance. But, we know with certainty that this is not a sustainable in the long term as there are bound to be years with low or negative returns which will bring down the long term compounded growth rate.

On a relative basis, this is less than desirable performance. The Hang Seng Index was one of the best performing stock index worldwide in 2017, returning 38.0% including dividends.

China property companies had a magnificent run in 2017, with companies like Country Garden (2007.HK) and China Evergrande (3333.HK) going up 5-6x. If I was running a short book, China Evergrande would be one of my prime candidates, even before its explosive growth in price. It is sometimes better to be lucky than good. This reinforces the notion that short selling is very difficult, and that you have to be really diversified. Jim Chanos’ long term performance of his short only fund is very impressive (a few percent compounded annual growth), given the difficulties in short selling and that the general stock market increases over time.

China Evergrande is one of the most leveraged property developers in China with a huge amount of inventory. In my opinion, any short term difficulty in the property or money market would easily cause it to go down under. However, 2017 was a very good year for property developers as the biggest players reported increases in sales of around 50% or more despite strong government controls in certain cities due to rapidly increasing housing prices. China Evergrande now trades at a price to book ratio of around 1.6, which I think is way too excessive.

Tencent Holdings (0700.HK) was responsible for a significant amount of the gains in the Hang Seng Index as it started the year at HKD 208, and ended at HKD 407 for a market capitalization of HKD 4 trillion. This is now equivalent to a 20% weighting in the market capitalization weighted Hang Seng index.

I did not have any position in Tencent at any point during the year, so this affected my relative performance negatively. Traditionally, value investors tend to avoid tech companies because it is difficult to predict their future given that the industry dynamics can change relatively quickly, drastically affecting their competitive positions. Blackberry is the most recent example that comes to mind. At its peak it was the best selling smartphone brand worldwide and worth over USD 70b. In a matter of less than 5 years, its market share was eaten away by Apple (AAPL) and Samsung. Today, there are hardly any consumers who use Blackberry phones.

I have been thinking the tech industry in the past few years, but never did any in-depth research so as to be able to initiate a position. My general observation and thoughts are that we have come to a point where an increasing amount of value in the economy in the future will be created by tech companies.

With such prospects, it may not be wise to avoid investing in tech companies just because of an old value investing paradigm. What works in investing are constantly being rewritten as the world evolves.

In 2018, I will look at tech companies more closely, and hopefully be able to get a level of understanding that allows me to initiate some positions in if the price is right.

Current significant positions:

Great Wall Motor (2333.HK)

Great Wall remains my biggest position, as I bought heavily in 2016 when it was trading at low, single digit P/E multiples. Rumours about a joint venture with BMW to produce electric MINI branded cars sent its price to a high of HKD 12, and it thereafter plummeted after the company confirmed that the two companies were still in talks. It ended 2017 at HKD 8.95 for a gain of about 31% for the year.

Since the automobile was invented in the 19th century, the returns of the US auto industry has not been good for investors. There were literally more than a hundred different auto manufacturers when the industry was in its early stage, as compared to the big three (Ford, GM, Chrysler) that we have in the US today, with GM and Chrysler emerging from bankruptcy reorganization in 2009.

Like airlines, auto manufacturing is a difficult industry. I think the reason for this is that there are little barriers to entry for mass market auto manufacturing. The industry as a whole does not earn good returns on capital because it is very competitive. For the mass market segment, only the lowest cost manufacturers can earn a good return on their capital. The Toyotas and Southwest Airlines of the world are the exceptions to the rule.

Despite the challenges, the reason I was comfortable with Great Wall was that it is a low cost, local vehicle manufacturer earning good returns on invested capital in an industry which still has a long runway for growth (Total vehicles per capita is only 0.2 in China compared to around 0.8 in the US). The fact that it was selling for a low multiple despite its impressive long term growth since 2003 also helped.

However, 2017 was a disappointing year for Great Wall. Total vehicle sales came in at 1.04m units (down 0.4% from 2016) vs the company’s 2017 target of 1.2m and around 4% increase for the industry. Profitability was also severely affected because of increased competition in the SUV segment, which comprised around 90% of the total vehicles sold by Great Wall.

Looking at competitors’ results, this is not what I had expected as other competitors like Geely Automobile (0175.HK) achieved higher profitability on the back of increased sales of around 60%.

Further, China is one of the world’s biggest markets for electric cars and is pushing to phase out fossil fuel cars by a few decades, so having an electric car model is essential for any auto manufacturer in China. Fortunately, Great Wall already has it in the works and the talks with BMW to help them produce electric MINI cars is a good sign.

The other major development in the auto industry is autonomous vehicles. This is still in its infancy, and it is difficult to predict how it will affect the industry.

Given the unexpected poor results and potential difficulties and uncertainties in the future, I will monitor future developments closely and sell down the position significantly if there is information to suggest that my assessment of the company was wrong.

 

Red Star Macalline (1528.HK)

Red Star Macalline is a owner of furniture malls in China, and by far the biggest player in the chain mall format. The furniture store industry in China is still relatively young and extremely fragmented, dominated by “mom-and-pop” individual stores.

Red Star Macalline’s business model is not what you’d expect in that it does not actually own any of the furniture inventory. Instead, it acts more like a property developer and landlord in that it purchases land to develop furniture malls, and leases out individual store units within the malls to furniture retailers.

Increasingly, in the past few years, Red Star Macalline has been moving towards an asset light business model, whereby it provides consultation and property management services to third parties for the construction and operation of Red Star Macalline branded furniture malls. This model allows the company to create a nationwide network at a much faster pace as little to no capital is required to provide such services to third parties. However, Red Star still retains ownership of malls in perceived good locations and tier 1 and 2 Chinese cities.

I think the industry is ripe for consolidation and there are significant advantages for the furniture chain mall format over individual stores. Being the biggest player in the industry and expanding quickly with an asset light approach, I believe that Red Star will be the market leader for years to come and may eventually be valued on a high P/E basis, in line with other asset light property companies such as Marriott.

Value Partners (0806.HK)

Value Partners is an asset manager, whose flagship equity fund had very good long term returns of around 15% after fees. They attribute this to their value investing and unique approach of conducting hundreds of company visits each year to conduct due diligence.

The results of asset managers can be very volatile, because the markets they invest in are volatile. Also, Their results may be affected greatly by client purchases and redemption, which are generally momentum driven by the results achieved by the manager in the recent few years.

That is to say, a lot of money piles in when the manager’s recent results are good, and the reverse is true when recent results are bad. For example, after the record year in 2007 when Value Partners achieved profits of HKD 1.4b with an AUM of USD 7.3b, the global financial crisis in 2008 made clients redeem USD 2.2b of funds.

Redemption of funds forces the manager to sell their holdings at the prevailing price, whether or not they think it is good for long term performance. Value Partners’ profit dropped to HKD 66m with an AUM of USD 3.2b at the end of 2008

Fortunately, Value Partners recovered subsequently and continued to deliver good results, ending 2017 with AUM of about USD 16.2b. I bought Value Partners in 2H 2017 because the market did not seem to be giving enough credit for the level of AUM and implied performance of Value Partners’ funds, given the good performance of the Hong Kong Stock and China stock market in 2017.

Zhou Hei Ya (1458.HK)

Zhou Hei Ya is a casual braised duck-parts seller. They offer products like braised duck neck, feet and clavicles. Judging from product photos, these are not things I will voluntarily put in my mouth. But, these snacks are well loved by the people in China.

In 2016, Zhou Hei Ya managed to sell 27,293 tonnes of braised duck parts through their self operated network of 778 retail outlets, generating revenues of RMB 2.8b and net profit of RMB 715m. All this from a standing start of a single outlet in Wuhan, Hubei in 2002, making founder Zhou Fuyu a billionaire in USD terms.

Zhou Hei Ya purchases duck parts from suppliers, and processes them in a factory in Hubei, before distributing them via their retail outlets, predominantly located in Central China. The economics of an individual retail store are highly compelling.  The average capex to setup each store of about 10 to 50 sqm is around RMB 120k and the payback period is less than a year. Stores in Zhou Hei Ya’s home province of Hubei are mainly in transport hubs and records annual sales of around RMB 4m per store, as compared to main competitor’s Juewei’s annual sales of around RMB 1m per store.

1H 2017 was good for Zhou Hei Ya. Revenues went up by 16.5% while net profits were up only 5.3%. Gross profit margins remained stable at around 60%, but selling and distribution expenses went up 37.3% due to increased marketing and promotion activities, for both online and offline. Marketing expenses are discretionary expenses which impact current earnings negatively, but are good for future earnings. This is because the image and consumer perception of the product is as important as the taste of the product itself.

The next phase of expansion will be centered outside of Hubei province. China is a big country, and there are different tastes and preferences of consumers in different parts of the country. It may be a challenge to adapt the product to local tastebuds. But anecdotally, Zhou Hei Ya and Juewei are the two most recognizable brand names in their category. I am optimistic about its growth prospects, although I expect annual sales of their stores outside Hubei to be lower.

Dali Foods (3799.HK)

Dali Foods is a snack food and beverage manufacturer from Fujian province. It sells snack food such as bread, cakes, pastries, chips, and biscuits, and beverages such as herbal tea, energy drinks and plant milk based drinks.

Its unique competitive advantage is the ability to launch and market new branded products quickly and effectively. For example, its energy drink brand, Hi-Tiger, was introduced in 2013 and brought in annual revenues of RMB 2b in 2016.

In 1H 2017, Dali Foods’ revenues went up 9.6% to RMB 9.9b and profits went up 6.9% to RMB 1.7b. A new soy bean milk drink was also introduced. The attractiveness of a branded food business is that once a brand is established in consumers’ minds through a combination of good taste and marketing, it will be a sticky and recurring source of revenue as consumers tend to form a habit in consumption and also tend to repurchase the same brand. Good processed food businesses like Kraft and Nestle can earn very attractive rates of return on their capital.

The interesting thing about Dali Foods is that it only placed the minimum allowable number of shares in their IPO in 2015, which is 15% of total outstanding shares. Looking at their financial statements, it seemed that they could have used internally generated capital to fund their near term expansion plans. This suggests that the owners IPOed due to other reasons. To date, their cash balance is around RMB 9-10b, which is just about the same amount raised during the IPO.

I started buying Dali Foods in mid 2016 when it was trading at around 15x P/E. I am optimistic about its long term growth as it introduces new products and widens its distribution network.

Link REIT (0823.HK)

In a typical REIT structure, there is a property developer parent who injects property assets into the REIT, sells it to outside investors but retains a majority shareholding. They are usually installed as the external REIT and property manager. The interests of the minority shareholders may not be aligned with the REIT manager’s due to their incentive structure and parent company backing. Hence, I am averse to investing in REITs in general.

To my knowledge, Link REIT is one of the very few REITs in Asia that is internally managed. It has the right incentive structure and a very good long term track record of creating value by good property management and through asset enhancement initiatives (AEIs) which boosts visitor numbers and rentals.

When I first bought Link REIT in 2015, it was trading at a considerable discount to its long term historical average. In 2017, Link REIT continued to deliver good results and increased dividends for the 11th year in a row, and the valuation gap has closed significantly.

 

Exited positions:

Anta Sports (2020.HK)

I bought a significant amount of Anta Sports starting in late 2016 at around 15x P/E. Anta is one of the most recognised sportswear brand (local) in China after Adidas and Nike, and recovered the quickest and strongest after an industry wide oversupply in 2013 led to significant declines in profit for all industry players. I thought that it was a high quality business with opportunities to reinvest capital at high rates of return, hallmarks of a long term compounder.  The stock experienced good earnings growth in 2017 and a big P/E multiple expansion, and I decided to trim the position significantly due to valuation. I am not sure if it is the right move to do anything but buy and sit tight when you find a good long term compounder, so I will make a mental note not to be averse to buy back shares at prices which are higher than what I sold them for.

AAC Technologies (2018.HK)

I bought some AAC Technologies in mid 2017 after it declined significantly on a short seller report asserting that it had inflated profits by offloading costs to previously undeclared related parties. AAC is a supplier of smartphone audio and haptic parts, its biggest customer being Apple. The main weakness of the short seller report was that the supposed related parties were actually profitable, albeit having much lower margins than AAC. You would expect these related parties to record a big net loss if AAC was shifting a significant amount of costs. Also given that AAC reported a sterling 1Q 2017, I bought some shares, which I later sold in 2H 2017 due to valuation after 1H 2017 results were not as good as 1Q 2017. The share price then proceeded to climb further.

Tier 2 & 3 (net net) basket

Sold Emperor E Hotel (0296.HK) +32.8%, China Ting (3398.HK) +69.1%, Chen Hsong (0057.HK) +24.5%, Hopefluent (0733.HK) +109.3%, Centron Telecom (1155.HK) +28.8%, Asia Cassava Resources (0841.HK) +97.9%.

Sold Sitoy Group (1023.HK) -13%, Jiangnan Group (1366.HK) -5.2% at a loss not long after I bought them after their fundamentals deteriorated which meant that the price had to fall further for it to be an attractive buy.

Outlook in 2018

I think that stocks are starting to become expensive in general, although the level of optimism in the markets is not indicative of a bubble. Also, there are no extremely mispriced bets in my portfolio, so I expect my returns in 2018 to be much lower than in 2017.

 

 

1H 2017 Performance Update

The porfolio is up 18.7% year to date, as compared to the Hang Seng Index’s 17.4%. The current porfolio composition is as follows:

Symbol Name % of portfolio
CASH 7.70%
2333 Great Wall Motor 27.48%
2020 Anta Sports 8.79%
0010 Hang Lung Group 7.18%
3799 Dali Foods 4.56%
2018 AAC Technologies 4.15%
0823 Link REIT 3.96%
0101 Hang Lung Property 3.15%
0020 Wheelock 2.45%
0004 Wharf Holdings 2.45%
0531 Samson Holdings 2.14%
1234 China Lilang 2.10%
3389 Hengdeli 1.77%
0688 China Overseas Land 1.73%
1528 Red Star Macalline 1.63%
1880 Belle Intl 1.62%
0887 Emperor Watch 1.61%
0985 Netmind Financial 1.50%
0242 Shun Tak 1.36%
0398 Oriental Watch 1.31%
6188 Beijing Digital 1.27%
0450 Hung Hing Printing 1.24%
2777 Guangzhou R&F 1.15%
1366 Jiangnan Group 1.10%
0210 Daphne International 0.99%
0083 Sinoland 0.97%
0709 Giordano 0.96%
1051 G-Resources 0.83%
0733 Hopefluent 0.83%
0420 Fountain Set 0.75%
0841 Asia Cassava Resources 0.74%
0330 Esprit Holdings 0.59%
1155 Centron Telecom 0.58%
1023 Sitoy Group 0.54%
0113 Dickson Concept 0.45%
0296 Emperor E Hotel 0.36%
0703 Future Bright Holdings 0.32%
0532 WKK International 0.16%

The overall market performed strongly,

Great Wall Motor (2333.HK) remains my largest position and was the largest contributor to performance, as it went up from HKD 7.19 at the start of the year to HKD 9.64 as of 30 Jun 2017. GWM is a remarkably efficient and low cost company operating in the highly competitive industry of automobile manufacturing.

GWM raised HKD 1.6b in its IPO in 2004, and increased revenues from RMB 3.7b in 2003 to RMB 98.4b in 2016, with a corresponding 20 fold increase in net profit. The growth was achieved mostly by internally generated funds , and the only other time capital was raised was in 2011 to the tune of about RMB 3.9b by issuance of new shares.

GWM had industry leading operating margins of around 12% in 2016, and it had been earning more than 20% returns on equity on little to no debt. This has gone down in the past few years due to increased competition, in the production of SUVs, which is what GWM specialises and had traditionally done well in. Increased price competition is a problem in an industry with low barriers to entry. Other threats in the future include the potential of autonomous vehicles and the gradual shift to electric vehicles.

China is already the biggest automobile market in the world, with sales of about 25-30m automobiles annually. Car ownership in China is about 2 cars for every 10 people, compared to around 8 cars for every 10 people in geographically vast countries with developed transport systems and high GDP per capita. I believe that there is much more room for growth for automobile sales in China because I think China will continue to prosper economically and continue to spend significant money on developing its infrastructure.

In summary, owning GWM is as much a bet on the continued growth of automobile sales in China as it is on the management team. At the current PE of about 10x, I think that I am getting very reasonable odds on the continued growth of the company despite the potential downfalls.

I sold off the 13% position in Biostime (1112.HK) completely because I thought that the business was not going to perform as well as expected and the company’s debt load was geting too high. This was explained in detail in this post earlier during the year.

The performance of the basket of statistically cheap companies was satisfactory, with more winners than losers. Positions sold during 1H 2017 include China Ting (3398.HK) (69% gain), Chen Hsong (0057.HK) (24% gain), HK & Shanghai Hotels (0045.HK) (68% gain). I sold Sitoy Group (1023.HK) at a 13% loss, as their 2016 results was significantly worse than expected.

AAC Technologies (2018.HK) is a new, decent sized position. AAC is a component supplier of iPhones and I had been following the company since a few years ago. Despite its high margins, growth and return of equity, I never bought the shares due to a perceived lack of understanding of the industry and general skepticism to Chinese companies with very high profit margins. From experience, a decent amount of companies with such characteristics have turned out to be frauds.

In May, a short seller report alleged that AAC was overstating profits by offloading costs to previously undeclared, related entities. Its price dropped by around 20% thereafter. In the meantime, AAC had earlier reported 1Q 2017 revenues and profits were up by around 70%.

After reading the report, I thought that there was one crucial point that was wrong. If costs were being offloaded to related entities, these entities would be making heavy losses. However, the report showed these entities as having positive operating margins. Then, a few weeks later, another short seller came up with a report attacking the first short seller, providing evidence as to why their due diligence process and conclusions were wrong.

The stock price went up after resuming trading but did not recover fully. I bought a position at about 17x 2017 estimated earnings because I was convinced that AAC’s huge margins compared to their competitors was real. And the reason AAC is able to maintain such high margins is because their product is protected by intellectual property rights, and each of the components (acoustic, microphone, and haptic) represent a small percentage of the total cost of production of a smart phone. When you are buying an important component of a product, and that component makes up a small percentage of the total cost of the product, you tend to go for the best quality component, and not the cheapest. This makes the product rather price inelastic, especially if it is patented.

 

 

Book Review – Double your profits in 6 months or less

This book by Bob Fifer, is a no nonsense, practical guide on how to increase a company’s profits significantly in a short amount of time. The author is a management consultant who had plenty of experience in improving profits at Fortune 500 companies. I got to know about this book because it is reportedly the required reading for all the managers at firms controlled by 3G Capital.

3G Capital started as a private equity firm in Brazil, and is most famous for acquiring Brahma Brewery in 1989 and eventually owning the world’s biggest beer company after last year’s proposed merger of AB Inbev and SAB Miller, by acquiring other beer companies and applying good management practices.

The book, The 3G Way, is a good introduction to the culture and management practices injected by 3G into the companies they acquired to achieve excellence in a relatively short amount of time. This article by the Economist shows just how good the managers at 3G are.

Fifer suggests 78 ways to cut costs and increase sales in order to increase profits. About 80% of the book is dedicated to weeding out unnecessary costs and the rest is about increasing sales by challenging the conventional notions of salesmanship and pricing policies.

Each of the 78 ways has a short, concise chapter written for it, reflecting the efficient management style that is advocated by the book. The pertinent points of the book are for managers to energetically cutting non-strategic costs and having a bias towards decision making based on managers’ experience and judgement (as opposed to having meetings and studies to consider decisions).

In order to build a profit maximising, world class organisation, the culture of the company has to be set by example from top down. Go all out in reducing non-strategic costs to the bone, maintain spending on strategic costs and reward employees based on meritocracy, not seniority. That is pretty much the playbook of 3G Capital described in The 3G Way.

 

There are also a few lessons for investors such as myself. The most important takeaway is that while being by and large qualitative and therefore difficult to judge, management quality is paramount. The same company handled by mediocre management as compared to excellent management can produce astonishingly different results. Buffett is not only great at judging the quality of businesses, he is also excellent at judging character and managerial competence. Many of the deals he did were inked in short order after meeting the CEO/founder, and without the standard due diligence procedures. That is probably a skill that is developed over decades of business experience. Without the same access to top level managers, retail investors can only pass judgement by reading annual reports and interacting with management during annual general meetings.

Another lesson is that there are a lot of inefficient companies in different industries out there that can be optimised without causing an upheaval within the company, creating extra value for shareholders “out of thin air”. Contrary to my belief that it may prove too difficult to alter a company’s culture (especially at a big company) so dramatically that it may affect its usual functioning, Fifer claims that when new measures are applied correctly, employees can quickly adjust to the new norms. With what 3G has done, we can now see that this is achievable even in big companies such as AB Inbev and Kraft Heinz. Both companies have industry beating margins under the tutelage of 3G.

As a side point, when companies become successful and grow bigger, they usually become plagued by the ABCs of business failure (Arrogance, bureaucracy and complacency). As business conditions change, they become a victim of their own success and they are unable to adapt quickly enough to survive. Who Says Elephants Can’t Dance and Only the Paranoid Survive are excellent books written by the managers of IBM and Intel about facing tough, major decisions as the business environment changed.

For every successful company transformation like at IBM or Intel in their history, there are many more business failures. That is something to think about as a value investor when we say that we would like to hold an investment forever. Though they are not easy to judge, business conditions and management quality change over time, and those two factors significantly affect our potential investment returns.

I recommend this book for all business owners and managers as there is a good chance that their business results can improve after applying the principles in the book.  It is also a good book for investors in building their overall understanding in how to judge management quality when assessing companies and thinking about the potential of creating value within existing companies just by being more efficient.

 

 

 

Jiangnan Group 1366.HK – Results

Two months ago I wrote about an opportunity on a possible privatisation offer: https://timetocompound.wordpress.com/2017/01/14/jiangnan-group-1366-hk/

At the time, I judged that the company was likely to be genuine and that the new major shareholder was genuinely looking to privatise the company probably due to its perceived low share price at the time.

If the privatisation did not go through, I did not expect the price to drop by much and we would be holding a company with an average business at a cheap price. However, I also noted that such a wide spread indicated that the market did not think that an offer was even remotely likely to materialise.

Yesterday, the company announced that due to the major shareholder’s inability to secure financing for the deal, they have decided to not go through with the offer. According to the stock exchange rules, they are not allowed to make another offer in the next 6 months.

Although it is not possible to ascertain ex-ante odds solely based on the outcome, I think that in all likelihood, the market had it right and I had overestimated the odds of an offer materialising (though I have no doubt that the company and the offeror’s intentions were genuine). China stepping up their controls against capital flight may have been one of the key reasons why it is difficult for companies now to secure financing for overseas deals.

After the announcement, Jiangnan’s share price did not drop by much (as expected), and I significantly cut down my stake at a price of around 1 HKD, for a loss of about 6-7%. The reason for this is because I had a medium sized stake betting on a certain event. When the event did not materialise, my returns going forward will depend on how the business performs. Given that I do not know much about the business, I will either eliminate the position completely or maintain a small position as part of diversified basket of stocks that are trading cheaply on a statistical basis. The fact that Jiangnan did not declare an interim dividend when it has always done so in the past is also a negative sign.

When facing a situation where you are getting a price which implies that either the market is very wrong or you are very wrong, I think it is important to go with your view after double checking your facts and thesis. As Benjamin Graham said, the market is there to serve you, not to guide you. Sometimes the market really gives you a really good deal and that is how you outperform the market. For the times that you were wrong, do a post mortem and make adjusments to your thought process for future decisions based on where you went wrong.

 

 

 

 

 

Hung Hing Printing 450.HK – Value partially unlocked

I have a small position in Hung Hing Printing (HHP) as part of a diversified basket of stocks that trade cheaply relative to their assets. Such companies typically have one or more of the following characteristics, which explains their cheap valuation:

  1. Poor business results and future outlook
  2. Poor capital allocation decisions
  3. Unfriendly treatment of minority shareholders
  4. Questionable accounting practices

HHP’s business is book and package printing, the consumer product packaging, the corrugated box and the trading of paper. In my opinion, this is a poor, commodity-like business and their results reflect it.

In the past 5 financial years, HHP averaged annual revenues of around 3b HKD and profits of 50k HKD, while employing net assets of 2.8b HKD. Despite not earning an adequate return on capital, HHP still deploys additional capital into the business, averaging around 100m HKD in fixed asset purchases annually.

As of 26 Feb 2017, HHP traded at a price of 1.3 HKD per share for a valuation of 1.1b HKD. This compares to their total net asset value of around 2.8b HKD and their total net current asset value of around 1.3b HKD.

On 27 Feb 2017, HHP announced the disposal of a wholly owned subsidiary:

Click to access LTN20170227630.pdf

The estimated net proceeds of the sale is 960m HKD, compared to the subsidiary’s net asset value was 55m HKD. This represents a gain in book value terms for HHP of about 905m HKD (1 HKD per share), which is almost as much as HHP was being valued by the market before the announcement. However, HHP’s price only went up from 1.3 HKD to around 1.55 HKD per share for a valuation of 1.4b HKD.

From this, there are a few things we can learn about buying stocks which trade cheaply relative to their assets. Such stocks can remain “cheap” for sustained periods of time for as long as their problems (discussed above) remain. For their prices to appreciate, I think that it can either happen when the general market sentiment becomes more optimistic (during which prices of all stocks in general appreciate) or when there is a “catalyst” that unlocks the value in a particular stock.

Catalysts are events which immediately increase the value of a stock by putting cash which was previously “stuck” in the company earning lousy returns in the shareholder’s hands, or changes in the underlying characteristics of the company’s business or management such that capital in the company earns better future returns.

Examples of catalysts are declaring significant dividends and/or stock repurchases, sale of an underperforming/undervalued subsidiary, privatisation bid for the company, change in management, an improvement in the company’s business prospects and so on.

Given the nature of catalysts, we are unable to predict when and what kind of catalyst will occur in the future. This forces us to maintain a diversified porfolio of such stocks in order to maximise our chances in realising gains when catalysts occur in the future.

I think that there are only two scenarios in which you can consider putting a substantial percentage of your portfolio into a single such stock. The first is when you know that a catalyst is going to happen AND the market has not priced it in properly. The second is when the stock itself is so cheap that the cheapness itself may very well become its own catalyst to realise its value.

I bought HHP at 0.96 HKD per share, when it was trading at around two thirds of its net current asset value, expecting to sell it when its valuation went up to its net current asset value (1.43 HKD per share).

In HHP’s case, I was fortunate that a subsidiary which was recorded at only 55m HKD in their books was sold for 960m HKD. This big gain on sale of a subsidiary is a great catalyst for unlocking value. As the subsidiary’s business is a break even one, the huge discrepancy in sale price and book value is probably due to the subsidiary owning some land that was bought decades ago (which has now appreciated considerably) recorded at historical cost in the books. When valuing a company, this is not information we can gather by just looking at their consolidated balance sheet. We can only imagine the huge amount of hidden value that could be extracted from a company’s assets.

A fine example of how much value can be unlocked from a catalyst is that of Luen Thai 0311.HK, which I wrote about in Dec 2016. Prior to the announcements (in Oct 2016) of the sale of some of their businesses, a special dividend payout, and a general takeover offer from a third party, their shares traded at around 1.80 HKD versus a book value per share of around 2.96 HKD. Today, less than 6 months later, after paying 1.57 HKD in dividends, their shares trade at 1.78 HKD.

But, as we will examine in HHP’s case, the big gain on sale of their subsidiary did not immediately translate into a big increase in the share price. The reason is because most of the gain is not immediately put into shareholders’ hands, which leads us back to the same problems why the stock trades cheaply to assets in the first place. In the same announcement on 27 Feb 2017, management also said that of the 960m HKD, it plans to plough 70% of the proceeds (672m HKD) into the business, 20% of the proceeds (192m HKD) for enhancing shareholder return in the next few years, and 10% of the proceeds (96m HKD) as working capital.

I assign zero value to the proceeds that will be reinvested into the business because I think that this capital is unlikely to see any returns for shareholders. The 192m HKD for enhancing shareholder return will be fully valued, as it is likely to be paid out as dividends. The 96m HKD for working capital will given a value of two thirds, as I would do when I value net current asset value. On a per share basis, this adds up to about 0.27 HKD. Hence, I raise my sell price target from 1.43 HKD to 1.70 HKD.

 

 

 

Berkshire Hathaway – 2016 Annual Letter to Shareholders

Berkshire Hathaway’s (NYSE: BRK.A) annual letter to shareholders was released yesterday: http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2016ltr.pdf

For followers of Warren Buffett and his company, his annual letter is always something to look forward to every year as it contains nuggets of wisdom about life, business, and investing. There is always something new to be learned whether you are a beginner or a seasoned investor.

For the uninitiated, since Buffett took control of Berkshire Hathaway in 1964, its share price has increased at an annual compounded rate of 20.8%. This means that $1 invested in 1964 would have turned into almost $20,000 in 2016. This is by far the most impressive public company record of creating long term shareholder wealth. Given Buffett’s generosity with dispensing investment advice, his annual letters are a must read for all investors.

As a long time follower of Buffett, his 2016 letter mostly contained topics which I am already familiar with. But they are worth repeating for newer followers who want to have a better understanding of how the company became what it is today and its guiding principles and future path.

One interesting thing I note is the inclusion of US Airlines in the marketable securities portfolio, with the two biggest airlines position being Southwest Airlines (NYSE: LUV) and Delta Airlines (NYSE: DAL). Though their combined value is not more than 5% of the overall portfolio, this is surprising because Buffett has famously eschewed investing in airlines in the past due to very poor industry economics leading to poor economic returns for almost all US airlines. He has been burnt more than once on investments in airlines. He even joked that a far sighted capitalist should have shot down  the first manned flight at Kitty Hawk. Now that he has money in airlines again, this must mean that he thinks that there has been a favourable change in industry dynamics to warrant an investment.

Although it has already been mentioned before in his past letters, one thing that stood out for me in the 2016 letter is the bet that Buffett made roughly ten years ago. He bet that the average total 10-year returns (after fees and expenses) of any five selected hedge funds will not beat the average returns obtained by investing in a low cost index fund in the same period of time.

In my opinion, the brilliance is not in Buffett making the bet itself, but it is in the reasoning process that led to the conclusion of his point. He reasoned as follows: Investors in the stock market are either passive investors (buy and hold investors who buys index funds) or active investors (people to try to outperform the stock market averages by timing and/or stock selection).

By definition, passive investors as a group earn the average stock market return. The sum of the returns of passive and active investors equal to the total stock market returns (before fees). Therefore, active investors as a group must also earn average stock market returns.

Even if all the geniuses in the world tried to outperform the stock market, at least some of them are destined to fail because they are competing against each other and their collective results will be no better than the market averages. This is a universal truth and a powerful result.

What this means for investors in hedge funds is that given the high fees levied on investors (usually 2% fixed fee plus 20% of profits) on top of the usual trading fees associated with buying and selling shares, they are even more likely to achieve a result which is poorer than the market average.

The running tally after 9 years? Index fund: 85.4%, Hedge funds: 22%. Unless something unexpected happens in 2017, Buffett will win the bet against hedge funds.

Therefore, we may conclude that for a “know nothing” investor, their best bet is investing in a low cost index fund. But wait, there is a caveat. As a general principle of investing, the price you pay is the single most important determinant of your investment returns. If the idea of buying index funds becomes so mainstream and popular that everyone starts buying into them, their price may be bid up to astronomical levels. Index funds, after all, consist of individual stocks which make up the stock index, and individual stocks may become overvalued from time to time. Should this happen, I think it would not be wise to invest in an index fund.

Talking about investing in index funds reminds me of the idea of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), which is the staple topic of any finance/investing course in business school. The core tenet of the EMH is that stock prices fully reflect all publicly available information, so trying to outperform the stock market by timing and/or stock selection is futile. Therefore, you can do no better than buying an index fund.

While the EMH made perfect sense to me back when I was in business school, over time I came to realise that in reality, the EMH is nothing but a nice academic construct. In theory, theory is the same as practice. In practice, it is not. Buffett puts it best when he said something to the extent of teaching the EMH to business students is like teaching beginning chess or bridge players that thinking about strategy adds no value whatsoever.

Before we move on, I do realise that refuting the conclusion of the EMH looks like going against Buffett’s advice in his annual letter as well as his bet against hedge funds. But then, Buffett, with his long term outperformance over the stock market, is living proof that the EMH is wrong. So, what gives?

The answer lies in an article written in 1984 by Buffett titled “The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville”. Given that there are many investors in the stock market, does the fact that a some of them outperform the market over a number of years proof that the EMH is wrong?

Imagine that we substitute our investors with a group of 10,000 coin tossing monkeys. After 10 consecutive tosses, we can expect around 10 monkeys (10,000*0.5^10) to have tosssed 10 heads in a row. If we liken tossing heads to investor outperformance in any given year, then the fact that some investors outperform over long periods of time can be explained purely by chance.

However (and this is the crux of the argument), Buffett argued, what if all of the 10 monkeys who outperformed all belonged to a certain zoo in Omaha, with similar traits and characteristics? Then, further investigation is warranted. In the article, nine investment fund managers with different individual investing styles were featured. The managers had two things in common – they outperformed the market by significant amounts over time, and they were alumni of the Benjamin Graham value investing school, as was Buffett.

To me, that was irrefutable proof that the EMH was wrong, and that it was worth devoting your time in studying value investing if you want to outperform the market. Since then, I learned that there are many different valid ways that investors have employed to outperform the market in the long term.

One of the ways, which has gained more popularity in recent times, is that of quantitative trading. This is a very short term, trading of stocks by modeling their behavior quantitatively, which is the total opposite of value investing in some ways. An example of a successful “quant” is James Simons, who started his trading career in his fourties and managed to amass an USD 18b fortune in thirty something years, thanks to annualised returns in excess of 50%. Alas, the requirements of this strategy are very rigorous – Simons was a mathematical genius who obtained his Phd at age 23 and had multiple important contributions in the field of Math and Science.

For mere mortals like me, I can only try to study everything I can about value investing and hope that I have the skill to outperform the market. After all, I am also subject to the same law that dictates that only a small group of active investors are destined to outperform the averages.

Only time will tell.

 

Biostime 1112.HK – Significantly reducing stake

When I bought Biostime in 2015, it was an infant formula producer in China which had highly enviable growth, margins and return on invested capital (>20%) since their IPO (in 2010) to 2014. Its stock price went up from about HKD 10 in 2010 to HKD 70 in 2014.

Biostime paid out some of their earnings as dividends, but also had a fast growing cash pile partly due to their explosive growth and partly due to their business model, which is to outsource production of their infant formula to a high quality producer in Europe. As a result of the OEM model, there is little need for capital expenditure for business expansion.

When a company exhibits a combination of high growth, high margins and a growing cash balance, history tells us to be mindful of the possibility that the company could be fraudulent.

Despite being flush with cash, Biostime raised RMB 2.4b in 2014 by issuing zero coupon convertible bonds, at a underlying strike price of around HKD 90. This raised my suspicions further. The only plausible reason to raise this much capital when there was sufficient cash for the business was that it was very cheap to do so. A strike price of HKD 90 implied a P/E of around 30-40x. This meant that the interest free bonds were unlikely to get converted into equity unless the business continues to do well in the next few years and/or the valuation on a P/E basis continues to be very high.

In 2014/2015, there was heavy competition in the infant formula market in China. Biostime’s growth stalled and margins were squeezed. In the first half of 2015, Biostime’s revenues fell 10% and net profits fell 34% (to RMB 204m) from the year before. Its stock price fell from a high of HKD 70 in early 2014 to its low teens in late 2015.

In Sep 2015, Biostime announced the acquisition of a 83% stake in Swisse, an eponymous producer of vitamins and other health supplements in Australia, for RMB 6b. This acquisition was funded by cash on hand, USD debt, and issuance of Biostime shares. Given that most of the existing cash was used up, it proves the authenticity of Biostime’s results since their IPO.

Swisse’s earnings for FY Jun 2015 was AUD 73m, equivalent to around RMB 330m. Earnings attributable to Biostime were 83% of 330m = RMB 273m = HKD 327m. If we just take Biostime’s FY 15’s interim earnings as a simple estimate of its full year earnings, it would imply full year earnings of RMB 204m*2 = RMB 408m = HKD 489m. Adding that to Swisse’s earnings would give us full year earnings of HKD 816m.

Total outstanding shares of 620m and a share price of around HKD 13 implied a market valuation of HKD 8b for Biostime. Given that I thought that Swisse’s business was likely to grow rapidly and that the troubles in the infant formula market were likely to be temporary (for reasons outlined below), paying a P/E of 10x for such a company was a bargain. Hence I put a significant portion of my portfolio in Biostime.

Due to cultural reasons and also the one child policy, parents in China typically spare no expense in obtaining the best money can get for their kids. Infant formula is no exception, as it is highly important for infant development. Because Biostime’s products are produced by a quality manufacturer in France, this partly explained their explosive growth in sales from 2010-2014.

However, super normal profits in an industry inevitably attracts competition, which may lead to an oversupply in the market. This leads to competitive pricing pressure, and poor results for all the players in the industry. This was the reason given by Biostime’s management for poor results in 2015. As we learn in Economics 101, such an oversupply is temporary. Sellers lower their prices to clear stock, and supply gets rationalised in the future.

A similar thing happened in the sportswear market in China in 2013. Up until then, sales and profits were growing for all of the listed sportswear manufacturers, and they got a bit overzealous in opening new stores. At the time, I recall seeing every other store being a sportswear store in certain popular shopping areas in Shenzhen. This resulted in a temporary oversupply, which then corrected itself after about one year. All of the listed sportswear manufacturers including leading China brand Anta 2020.HK took a hit in 2013, but then almost all of them later recovered to varying degrees.

Given that infant formula typically has a shelf life of one year, buyers cannot stock up on the product for future use. This meant that good results in the past were an indication of the demand in that particular year. Assuming that the market players were rational, I thought that the situation in the infant formula market were most likely going to play out as it did in the sportswear market. Hence, the most likely scenario was that Biostime’s results will improve in about 1-2 years. The other possibility is that sellers do not behave rationally and continue to oversupply the market for a prolonged period, as we see this happening in other markets such as in aluminium and the car rental market. This will lead to poor results for industry players.

Generally speaking, the reputation for quality of food sold in China is not good. There were several food safety incidents such as the melamine tainted infant formula scandal in 2008, fake foods such as eggs and meat being passed off as the real deal, and more recently in 2014, Ting Hsin (parent company of Tingyi 0322.HK) being found using recycled oil in their food products.

Increasingly, because of the distrust towards locally sold infant formula, many parents went to the extent of sourcing the product from overseas to ensure their quality. Hong Kong, which borders the south eastern China city of Shenzhen, was a popular place for parents and traders to buy infant formula. The demand from China was so great that people in Hong Kong started to complain about a shortage of infant formula and in 2013, Hong Kong passed a law which limited the number of cans of infant formula allowed out of Hong Kong to 2 cans per traveler.

Australia is also a popular destination for Chinese people to buy infant formula. In particular, the Bellamy (ASX: BAL) brand of infant formula is most popular among Chinese parents. Another product that is popular among Chinese people in Australia are vitamins and health supplements, of which Swisse and Blackmores (ASX: BKL) are the market leaders. A list of products sold can be found on here. Such products are in such high demand that when Chinese people travel to Australia, they typically buy the product and bring it back home to China. For Chinese living in Australia, they buy the product and send it to their families in China by post.

Biostime has an existing distribution network in China, so acquiring Swisse allowed them to distribute their products in China, saving the need for Chinese people to buy the product from Australia and bringing or shipping it back. It also opens up the potential of serving a much bigger domestic market in China. This led to my optimism on Swisse’s business post acquisition.

However, there are some downsides. Firstly, the bulk of Swisse’s product range is neither patented nor proprietary. Swisse’s mouth watering 25% net profit margin means that new entrants can easily under price Swisse on similar products. Indeed, during my visits to Australia over the years, I noticed an increasing number of new competitors to Swisse. Branding may play some part in consumers’ buying decision, but we know very well that increased supply and price competition will mostly lead to reduced sales/prices for the incumbents.

It is interesting to study consumers’ attitudes towards brands in different industries. In certain markets that sell a commodity, the brand can mean everything. A shiny stone packed in their signature blue box can command a hefty premium compared to the same stone sold elsewhere. I am of course talking about Tiffany and Co’s (NYSE: TIF) diamond rings. On the other hand, for a product with different technical specifications such as television sets, its brand does not generally mean much. As a result, it is well known that TV manufacturers such as Sony and Panasonic do not have great results in this market.

Even though Biostime and Blackmores are the current market leaders, due to the relatively short amount of time in which the brands became established, and that the bulk of their products can be easily replicated, I am taking the view that it will be more susceptible to pricing pressures.

Secondly, although it is generally accepted that vitamins and health supplements are good for your health, except for certain supplements which target specific ailments such as high cholesterol, its effects are not easily measurable. This is because your general health and general well being is affected by a number of different factors, such as diet, genetics, mood, exercise and so on. As a result, the consumption of vitamins and supplements may help in achieving good health, but it may not be directly attributable to it. In the long run, there is some doubt as to whether consumers will continue to believe that taking such products are essential for good health.

Fast forward to today. A couple of developments led me to rethink my thesis and decide to pare down my bet significantly. Biostime’s infant formula results were still weak in 2016 and Swisse sales did not grow as much as expected. In the nine months to Sep 2016, infant formula revenues were down marginally from the previous year. Margins also did not improve. Management suggested that sustained price competition due to tighter regulations to be introduced in 2017, leading producers to produce more before new regulations kick in (preventing those without a quality certificate issued by the government from selling), were to blame for the poor results. I am somewhat skeptical of this reason, as I can see that publicly listed competitor Bellamy’s achieved much better results over the same period. This suggests that there may be a shift in consumers’ preferences to overseas produced brands that are also foreign owned. Although Biostime is still able to maintain its market share of 5-6% since its peak in 2014, I am erring on side of caution.

China also relaxed its decades-long one child policy on 1 Jan 2016, allowing couples to have two children. This is positive news for the infant formula market, but recent numbers suggest that the policy was not as effective as intended, as live births only increased by 1.4m to 17.6m in 2016 as compared to 2015. This is an increase of less than 10%.

Most worrying are management’s capital allocation decisions, which resulted in Biostime taking on more debt and foreign currency risk than I am comfortable with. As of 30 Jun 2016, Biostime has convertible bonds due 2019 totalling RMB 1.1b, and bank loans and senior notes of around RMB 5.6b, of which around RMB 3.9b is denominated in USD. This is a total debt of RMB 6.7b against total equity of RMB 4.1b. Annual interest payments will total around RMB 500m, against estimated operating profit before interest and taxes of around RMB 1.5b. Biostime’s revenues are mainly in AUD and RMB, while majority of the debt is in USD. Any adverse movements in currency and/or negative market developments may make it difficult for Biostime to service their interest payments.

Also, approximately USD 250m (RMB 1.6b) of the senior notes (7.25% coupon) was issued to fund the repurchase some of the convertible bonds that were issued in 2014. The bonds are interest free and in my opinion unlikely to be converted into equity in 2019 due to the high strike price of HKD 90. Exchanging interest free debt for high yielding foreign currency debt does not seem like a good idea to me.

On 24 Jan 2017, Biostime issued another USD 200m in senior notes at 7.25% to fund the acquisition of the remainig 17% stake in Swisse. CEO of Swisse Radek Sali also resigned to pursue personal interests. Both are not encouraging developments. Biostime’s debt will now increase by another RMB 1.5b, and will add on more currency risk and leverage to an already high leveraged company.

After revisiting the pros and cons of the thesis, at the current share price of around HKD 27, which represents a P/E of around 18x, I do not like the odds I am being given to take on the risk. Hence, I am significantly reducing my stake and quite possibly exiting the position.